
The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr. Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

1. Principal, De Paul Arts and Science College- Edathotty, Email: peterooroth@gmail.com

2. Faculty of Economics, De Paul Arts and Science College- Edathotty,

Abstract

The outbreak of the military conflict codenamed "Operation Epic Fury" on February 28, 2026, and the subsequent maritime blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, catalyzed one of the most severe asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in modern economic history. This research paper provides an exhaustive analysis of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) variations and structural economic impacts across four highly exposed geopolitical entities: the United States, Israel, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, during the period of January to June 2026. Utilizing empirical data, alongside novel econometric frameworks such as the Hormuz Chokepoint Vulnerability Index (HCVI) and the Multi-Commodity Contagion Index (MCCI), the analysis delineates the direct and indirect transmission channels of the crisis. The research reveals a profound divergence in economic resilience. While the United States economy demonstrated relative insulation driven by artificial intelligence (AI) capital expenditures, frontline economies faced systemic disruptions. The GCC experienced the collapse of the petrodollar recycling mechanism through the "Hormuz Paradox," Israel confronted severe labor and consumption contractions, and Iran suffered catastrophic infrastructural and sovereign revenue destruction. Ultimately, the paper evaluates the June 2026 Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, assessing whether the diplomatic resolution can reverse the deep structural scarring inflicted upon the global economy.

Key Words: Macroeconomics, GDP, Global Contagion, Inflation, Artificial Intelligence

Introduction

In January 2026, the global economy was poised for a period of stabilization and moderate expansion. Inflationary pressures from the early 2020s were largely receding, central banks were preparing for dovish pivots, and robust technological investments were driving equity valuations to historic highs¹. Growth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was accelerating, supported by economic diversification programs in the Gulf and the rollback of OPEC+ production cuts⁴. Prior to the conflict, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been prepared to upgrade its global growth forecast, citing a technology investment boom, easing trade tensions, and buoyant financial markets⁷.

This trajectory was violently interrupted on February 28, 2026, by the commencement of Operation Epic Fury, a coordinated military campaign by the United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran⁸. The conflict immediately escalated beyond a localized military engagement when Iranian forces closed the Strait of Hormuz on March 4, 2026⁹. Serving as

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr. Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

the transit chokepoint for approximately 20 million barrels of crude oil per day—roughly 20% of global petroleum consumption and over a quarter of all seaborne oil trade—alongside one-fifth of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, the closure triggered the most significant energy supply disruption since the 1973 oil embargo¹⁰.

The immediate removal of 13 million barrels per day of Gulf exports from the global market resulted in a near-instantaneous commodity shock¹⁰. Brent crude prices surged by 55.3%, peaking at \$126 per barrel by late March, up from a pre-war baseline of approximately \$72.48⁸. However, the 2026 crisis distinguished itself from historical energy shocks through its multi-commodity contagion architecture. Beyond hydrocarbons, the maritime blockade stranded critical supplies of agricultural fertilizers, petrochemicals, and semiconductor-grade helium¹².

The resulting economic shockwaves fundamentally altered the GDP trajectories of the involved nations. The World Bank swiftly downgraded its 2026 global growth forecast to 2.5%, down from an anticipated 2.9%, characterizing the environment as the lowest growth rate since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic¹⁵. A 2026 Global Peace Index (GPI) study revealed that a resumption of the Iran war could result in a \$2.2 trillion to \$3.5 trillion hit to the world economy, exceeding the economic shock of the Russia-Ukraine war in its first year¹⁰. The impact, however, was highly asymmetrical. The following sections provide an exhaustive examination of how the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC navigated the dual crises of physical destruction and global supply chain paralysis between January and June 2026.

Methodological and Theoretical Framework

To quantify the macroeconomic deterioration observed in the first half of 2026, contemporary economic literature rapidly developed novel econometric models to capture the unique nature of the Hormuz blockade. The crisis operated not merely through supply deficits, but through an "Insurance Cascade"—a phenomenon where the global war-risk insurance architecture priced maritime routes shut, achieving a de facto blockade even in the absence of kinetic strikes on every vessel¹¹. The Strait of Hormuz became completely commercially paralyzed, with tanker traffic falling from a baseline of 56 daily transits to single digits, stranding over 3,200 vessels in the corridor by early March¹¹.

The transmission of this shock to national GDPs can be understood through three primary econometric models calibrated during the crisis. The Multi-Commodity Contagion Index (MCCI) was developed as a composite time-series index measuring the velocity and breadth of the supply shock. The MCCI peaked at a maximum value of 100 on March 27, 2026, exhibiting an unprecedented escalation-to-abatement velocity ratio of 22:1⁸. This indicated that the contagion spread across interconnected markets—including energy, food, and base metals—22 times faster than the market's ability to price in abatement or alternative supply routes⁸.

Furthermore, the Hormuz Chokepoint Vulnerability Index (HCVI) was established as a cross-country Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression framework measuring national exposure to the Strait. The HCVI successfully explains 84.7% of the variance in cross-country GDP revisions during Q1 and Q2 2026, yielding a coefficient of determination (R^2) of 0.847 for a

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr.Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

sample of 18 nations, excluding the structural outlier of Iran⁸. Nations with high HCVI scores experienced the most severe GDP downgrades.

Finally, the Chokepoint Supply Chain Amplification Multiplier (CSCAM) estimates the total downstream economic destruction caused by upstream blockades. The CSCAM calculated an aggregate global amplification multiplier of \$3.20 in GDP loss for every \$1 of direct chokepoint disruption⁸. Analysis also revealed a Geopolitical Stagflation Surface (GSS) nonlinearity: once oil prices breached the \$110 per barrel threshold, the marginal GDP cost per dollar of additional oil price increases effectively doubled¹⁸.

Econometric Model	Primary Metric Evaluated	Key Finding / Peak Value	Implication for Global GDP
Multi-Commodity Contagion Index (MCCI)	Velocity of multi-sector supply shock	Peaked at 100 (March 27, 2026); Velocity ratio 22:1	Commodity contagion spread 22x faster than market abatement, locking in inflation.
Hormuz Chokepoint Vulnerability Index (HCVI)	Sovereign exposure to maritime blockades	$R^2 = 0.847$ variance explained	Highly accurate predictor of Q1/Q2 2026 GDP downgrades across 18 analyzed economies.
Chokepoint Supply Chain Amplification (CSCAM)	Downstream economic destruction	\$3.20 GDP loss per \$1 of disruption	Exponential amplification of upstream energy blockades into retail and manufacturing.
Geopolitical Stagflation Surface (GSS)	Non-linear threshold for economic damage	\$110/bbl threshold	Marginal GDP destruction doubles for every dollar increase above \$110/bbl Brent crude.

These transmission channels—energy inflation, supply chain stranding, insurance prohibitive pricing, and risk-premium expansion—served as the primary vectors through which the geopolitical crisis degraded domestic economic output across the globe.

Global Contagion: The Dual Blockade and The Hormuz Paradox

The 2026 crisis initiated a structural anomaly termed the "Hormuz Paradox." In historical energy crises, such as the 1970s oil embargo, major oil-exporting nations benefited from the resulting price spikes through massive windfalls¹⁰. In 2026, however, the conflict physically sealed the primary export corridor, meaning regional producers could not get their products to market¹⁰. The Gulf states were hit twice over: cut off from export revenues at the precise

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr.Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

moment their import costs rose and their infrastructure was subjected to kinetic bombardment¹⁰.

The physical realities of the blockade were cemented by a "Dual Blockade" environment that persisted from mid-April through late May 2026. Following the failure of early ceasefire attempts, the United States Navy blockaded Iranian ports, while Iran simultaneously blockaded the Gulf⁹. U.S. forces actively intercepted oil tankers, utilizing Boeing P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft and naval destroyers to force vessels to reverse course, costing the Iranian economy an estimated \$500 million daily in early April⁹. Despite these measures, a "Shadow Fleet" of up to 1,140 vessels emerged, heavily utilizing satellite spoofing, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming, and "dark" transits without automatic identification systems to evade sanctions⁹.

The blockade caused Brent crude to surge past \$120 per barrel, with analysts warning of a potential spike to \$170 to \$200 per barrel if the disruption persisted, a scenario that would trigger an inflation-adjusted equivalent to the July 2008 peak leading up to the Global Financial Crisis⁷. The Brent-WTI price spread widened drastically from a pre-conflict mean of \$4.11 to \$10.73 per barrel, reflecting the differential geographic exposure to seaborne Middle East crude supply²⁰.

Commodity / Asset	Pre-War Baseline (Jan/Feb 2026)	Peak Value (Mar/Apr 2026)	Primary Disruption Driver
Brent Crude Oil	~\$72.48 / barrel	\$126.00 / barrel	Immediate stranding of 13m bpd of Gulf exports.
U.S. Gasoline (Average)	\$2.98 / gallon	\$4.30 / gallon	Upstream crude constraints passing through to retail.
European Natural Gas (TTF)	~€30 / MWh	>€60 / MWh	Stranding of Qatari LNG and 30% EU winter storage.
Urea Fertilizer (Futures)	Baseline Index	+40% increase	GCC accounts for 50% of global urea exports, all stranded.
Aviation War-Risk Insurance	\$20,000 - \$35,000	Up to \$75,000	Extreme airspace risk pushing premiums to prohibitive levels.

The systemic shock extended deeply into industrial inputs. The Gulf accounts for 45% of

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr.Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

global sulfur and 50% of global urea exports, triggering a massive fertilizer shortage expected to hit South Asian and East African harvests on a six-to-nine-month lag¹⁰. Qatar produces approximately 40% of the world's helium—a critical input for semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan and South Korea—meaning the maritime blockade threatened global technology supply chains¹⁰.

GDP Variation and Macroeconomic Impact: United States

The macroeconomic performance of the United States between January and June 2026 presented a profound paradox. Despite being a primary belligerent in Operation Epic Fury, the U.S. economy exhibited remarkable insulation from the worst contractions seen globally. This resilience was driven by the nation's status as a net energy exporter and the overriding momentum of domestic technology investments.

First Quarter Resilience and the Artificial Intelligence Shield

In the first quarter of 2026, the U.S. economy expanded at an annualized rate of 2.0%, a highly robust figure given that military operations commenced in late February and disrupted global trade for the entirety of March²¹. The expansion was predominantly engineered by the technology sector. Capital expenditures in artificial intelligence acted as a massive counterweight to geopolitical headwinds, with business spending on equipment and structures surging by 10.4% in the first quarter—the most robust rate since Q2 2023²². AI diffusion alone contributed an estimated 0.97 percentage points to GDP growth, outpacing the 0.81 percentage point gain seen during the early 2000s internet boom²².

Furthermore, U.S. consumers demonstrated significant resilience, shaking off the surging gas prices during March to increase overall spending by 1.6% in the first quarter²². Because the U.S. economy is increasingly service-oriented and digitally driven, the physical constraints of the Hormuz closure affected a significantly smaller proportion of total output compared to manufacturing-heavy emerging markets. By May 2026, the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model estimated annualized U.S. real GDP growth at 4.3% in Q2, underscoring a widening growth divergence between the United States and its European and Asian peers²³.

Inflationary Drag and Monetary Policy Complexities

Despite robust topline GDP figures, the U.S. economy was not entirely immune to second-order effects. The primary transmission mechanism was domestic inflation, imported via global energy markets. The average price of gasoline in the U.S. surged 44%, rising from \$2.98 per gallon before the conflict to \$4.30 by late April²². This acted as a highly regressive consumption tax on American households, crowding out discretionary expenditures. Consequently, retail sales began to exhibit signs of easing, with January 2026 sales down 0.2% month-on-month, though remaining 3.2% higher year-on-year largely due to inflationary padding¹⁹.

Higher input costs across the supply chain abruptly halted the disinflationary trends that characterized late 2025. The U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) for February rose to 2.4% year-on-year, and the core Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index—the Federal Reserve's preferred gauge of inflation—climbed to 3.2% annually by March, moving firmly away from the central bank's 2.0% target¹⁹.

This resurgence of inflation severely complicated U.S. monetary policy. Prior to the war,

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr. Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

futures markets had priced in multiple interest rate cuts for 2026, with the first expected in June¹⁹. However, as the MCCI peaked and energy prices remained elevated, the Federal Reserve was forced to maintain a restrictive stance. Chairman Jerome Powell and the Federal Open Market Committee held the federal funds rate steady at a range of 3.5% to 3.75%, explicitly citing the conflict in the Middle East as a primary driver of near-term uncertainty and inflationary pressure²². Financial markets reacted swiftly; the yield on the 10-year Treasury note rapidly rose from below 4.0% to 4.2%, and 30-year mortgage rates rebounded by 25 basis points to 6.23% by late April, placing downward pressure on housing starts and general credit demand³.

Fiscal Deficit Expansion and Revisions

Fiscally, the war imposed new and significant burdens on the United States. Defense outlays increased sharply, a typical phenomenon during wartime booms where defense spending generally increases by about 2.7 percentage points of GDP over a multi-year period². The federal deficit, which had been projected to stabilize at 5.8% of GDP for 2026, faced immediate upward pressure. Analysts projected that the deficit could widen to -6.5% of GDP in 2026 as the government absorbed the operational costs of the naval blockades and aerial campaigns³. Should proposals to permanently increase military spending by \$500 billion annually materialize, the deficit was projected to exceed -8.0% of GDP by 2027, placing federal debt on a trajectory to rapidly surpass 100% of GDP³.

Ultimately, while the United States avoided the technical recessions that plagued the Middle East and Europe, the conflict shaved an estimated 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points off the annual baseline, leading forecasters to revise 2026 U.S. GDP growth down to a range of 2.2% to 2.4%³.

GDP Variation and Macroeconomic Impact: Israel

The State of Israel entered 2026 anticipating a robust macroeconomic recovery following the cessation of the 2024-2025 conflicts in Gaza. Pre-war estimates by the Bank of Israel and the Finance Ministry projected an annual GDP growth rate exceeding 5.2%²⁴. However, the initiation of hostilities with Iran fundamentally altered this trajectory, inducing a severe contraction in the first quarter of the year.

First Quarter Contraction and Labor Supply Shocks

In Q1 2026, Israel's GDP contracted by an annualized rate of 3.3%, abruptly ending two consecutive quarters of growth²⁶. On a per capita basis, the contraction was even steeper at 4.5%, signaling a sharp and immediate decline in the national standard of living²⁴.

The primary driver of this contraction was a severe labor supply shock combined with a collapse in domestic demand. The large-scale mobilization of reserve soldiers stripped the workforce of critical personnel, a dynamic that particularly impacted the high-tech sector—the historical engine of Israeli economic growth²⁷. Furthermore, continuous ballistic missile fire from Iran and its regional proxies necessitated the temporary closure of schools and businesses, significantly restricting economic activity on the home front and paralyzing daily commerce²⁵.

Consumer behavior rapidly mirrored the deteriorating security environment. Private consumption expenditure plummeted by 4.7% year-on-year in the first quarter²⁶.

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr. Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

Concurrently, exports of goods and services dropped by 3.7%, a stark reversal from the 28.9% expansion witnessed in Q4 2025, reflecting severe supply chain disruptions and logistical bottlenecks at major seaports²⁷. The tourism and hospitality sectors were effectively frozen as international airlines canceled routes and airspace closures isolated the nation²⁵.

Fiscal Expansion and the Stagflationary Dilemma

To sustain the intense war effort, the Israeli government was forced to implement emergency fiscal measures. The government approved an additional 32 billion shekels (approximately \$10.3 billion) in immediate defense spending, with an additional 12.8 billion shekels held in reserve if high-intensity conflict persisted²⁸. Consequently, the national deficit ceiling was forcibly raised from 3.9% of GDP to 5.1%²⁸. Conversely, civilian government consumption readings in Q1 worsened, dropping by 4.8% as non-essential spending was heavily curtailed to redirect capital toward military operations²⁷.

The Bank of Israel faced a classic stagflationary dilemma: combatting a contracting, war-torn economy while managing rising inflation fueled by supply shortages, global energy spikes, and a tightening domestic labor market. Governor Amir Yaron opted to hold the benchmark interest rate steady at 4.0% for consecutive meetings, resisting intense pressure to lower borrowing costs²⁵. The central bank cited the high geopolitical uncertainty, rising flight prices, and increasing food costs due to global fertilizer shortages as justifications for maintaining restrictive monetary policy²⁵. Annual inflation for 2026 was projected to accelerate to 2.2% before gradually slowing in 2027²⁵.

Revised Trajectory and Long-Term Scarring

The prolonged nature of the conflict forced continuous downward revisions of Israel's economic outlook. By late March, the Finance Ministry's Chief Economist, Shmuel Abramzon, revised the 2026 GDP growth forecast down from the initial 5.2% to a highly volatile range of 3.3% to 3.8%²⁴. This projection was heavily caveated, dependent entirely on a mid-year cessation of hostilities across multiple fronts²⁵. The economic scarring revealed that while Israel's capital-intensive technology sector possessed inherent resilience, the broader economy could not sustain concurrent, multi-front military mobilizations without triggering deep structural output declines.

GDP Variation and Macroeconomic Impact: Islamic Republic of Iran

The economic consequences of the 2026 war on the Islamic Republic of Iran were unequivocally catastrophic. Entering the conflict already burdened by years of international sanctions, hyperinflation, and systemic structural inefficiencies, the Iranian economy was uniquely vulnerable to physical infrastructural destruction and total trade embargoes⁹.

The Scale of Economic Destruction

Comprehensive estimates formulated during the conflict suggest that the physical and economic damage inflicted on Iran amounted to approximately \$144 billion, equating to a staggering 40% of its pre-war GDP³⁰. The 2026 Global Peace Index (GPI) models projected that under a baseline scenario of prolonged stalemate and blockade (Scenario 2), Iran's GDP would contract by a devastating 15% in 2026¹⁰. The IMF's more conservative initial baseline recorded a 7.2 percentage point downward revision, placing Iran's official GDP growth for the year at -6.1%³¹.

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr.Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

The economic damage model for Iran can be bifurcated into two distinct categories: hydrocarbon revenue losses and physical replacement costs.

Hydrocarbon Annihilation and the Dual Blockade

Iran relies on crude oil exports for approximately one-quarter of its national income¹⁰. The conflict effectively zeroed out these revenues. While Iran initiated the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the United States responded with a comprehensive naval blockade of Iranian ports⁹. U.S. forces intercepted tankers and established an insurmountable maritime perimeter, costing the Iranian economy an estimated \$435 million to \$500 million per day in lost export revenue during the height of the blockade⁹.

Cumulative hydrocarbon revenue losses—spanning crude oil, natural gas, and petrochemicals—were calculated at \$53 billion for the year³⁰. The damage was exacerbated by precise kinetic strikes on Iranian energy hubs. U.S. and Israeli airstrikes targeted Qeshm Island, Kharg Island, and the South Pars gas field⁹. An attack on the Asaluyeh/South Pars complex on March 18 alone neutralized over 48% of Iran's pre-war petrochemical output, inflicting deep supply chain damage that analysts estimate will take a minimum of 12 months to rectify³⁰.

Infrastructure Demolition and Internal Collapse

Beyond lost revenues, the physical replacement costs of assets destroyed during Operation Epic Fury were estimated at \$91 billion³⁰. Military and strategic assets, including nuclear facilities, missile production lines, air bases, and air defense systems, accounted for roughly \$46 billion of this damage—equivalent to four to six years of Iran's pre-war defense budget³⁰. The domestic economy ground to a complete halt. To control information flow and thwart cyber-attacks, the Iranian government instituted a "near total" internet blackout that lasted for over 240 hours⁹. Internet connectivity dropped to just 4% of ordinary levels, severely crippling domestic commerce, the vast informal economy (which accounts for roughly 30% of all activity), and digital banking⁹. Airstrikes on industrial hubs caused massive physical damage and environmental disasters, releasing toxic chemicals that triggered 'black rain' in major cities⁹. Schools, businesses, and government offices shuttered, effectively turning Tehran into a "ghost town" during the peak of the bombings⁹. The resulting domestic environment was characterized by intense currency volatility, acute supply shortages, and massive capital flight, pushing the Iranian economy to the brink of systemic collapse and forcing the leadership to the negotiating table by June⁹.

GDP Variation and Macroeconomic Impact: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States

The GCC states represent the epicenter of the "Hormuz Paradox." Because the conflict physically sealed the primary export corridor, these nations were cut off from global markets at the exact moment their commodity prices surged, resulting in a systemic collapse of the regional economic model⁹. The World Bank and the IMF enacted unprecedented mid-cycle downgrades for the GCC, lowering aggregate real GDP growth for 2026 by up to 4.6 percentage points, resulting in an expected regional contraction of 2.4%³³.

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr.Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

GCC Nation	Pre-War 2026 GDP Forecast	Revised Q2 2026 GDP Forecast	Primary Economic Constraint
Qatar	+2.5%	-14.7%	Complete LNG export stranding; severe Ras Laffan facility damage.
Kuwait	+3.1%	-4.2%	Exhausted storage capacity resulting in forced crude production halts.
Bahrain	+2.9%	-3.8%	Total oil export blockage; major disruption to aluminum supply chains.
UAE	+3.8%	-1.9%	Limited bypass capacity; total collapse of inbound tourism and aviation.
Saudi Arabia	+4.5%	-1.4%	East-West pipeline limitations; stalling of Vision 2030 initiatives.
Oman	+2.2%	-0.05%	Rerouting bottlenecks and indirect regional financial contagion.

Data compiled from IMF Regional Economic Outlook (April 2026) and Oxford Economics³³.

Sovereign Downgrades and Physical Damage

The severity of the contraction correlated directly with a nation's geographical reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. Qatar suffered a devastating 14.7% contraction, the most severe in the region⁵. Qatar relies entirely on the Strait for its LNG exports and possesses no alternative pipeline routes. Strikes on the Ras Laffan complex damaged 17% to 20% of the nation's production capacity; because only three companies worldwide manufacture the required

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr. Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

large-frame turbines, restoration is estimated to take three to five years, costing Qatar \$20 billion annually in lost revenues³⁴.

Kuwait (-4.2%) and Bahrain (-3.8%) similarly lacked alternative maritime routes. Their hydrocarbon storage facilities quickly reached maximum capacity, forcing a total shutdown of domestic production³⁵. Kuwait's crude output plummeted from 1.27 million barrels per day to 800,000, while Bahrain suffered massive disruptions to its primary non-oil export engine, Aluminum Bahrain (Alba)¹³. The UAE (-1.9%) and Saudi Arabia (-1.4%) fared marginally better, utilizing alternative infrastructure like Saudi Arabia's East-West Yanbu pipeline to the Red Sea, which sustained 5 million barrels per day in crude exports³³. However, this capacity was vastly insufficient. In total, the International Energy Agency estimated that repairing the 80 damaged energy facilities across the Arab Gulf states would cost \$58 billion³⁴.

The Collapse of Non-Oil Sectors: Tourism, Aviation, and Food Security

The blockade systematically dismantled the GCC's economic diversification achievements. Tourism, a cornerstone of Saudi Vision 2030 and the UAE's economic model, suffered catastrophic declines. Regional flight volumes plummeted by 50% due to airspace closures and exorbitant aviation war-risk insurance premiums, which spiked to \$75,000 per flight³⁴. The region lost an estimated 23 to 38 million visitors in the first half of the year, translating to a revenue hemorrhage of \$34 billion to \$56 billion³⁴. Hotel occupancy in Dubai crashed from 81.1% to 22.8% in mid-March, prompting the government to release a \$272 million stimulus package to support hospitality businesses³⁴.

Furthermore, the maritime blockade precipitated an acute food and water security crisis. The GCC relies on the Strait for over 80% of its caloric intake⁹. By mid-March, 70% of food imports were disrupted, triggering a "grocery supply emergency" and forcing consumer prices up by 40% to 120% via highly expensive airlifts initiated by retailers like Lulu Retail⁹. Compounding the crisis, Iranian strikes on regional desalination plants—which supply 99% of drinking water in Qatar and Kuwait—pushed the macroeconomic crisis to the brink of a humanitarian disaster⁹.

Central Bank and Fiscal Responses

To prevent total financial contagion, GCC governments and central banks initiated massive liquidity measures. Reserve requirements were slashed from 5.0% to 3.5% in Bahrain, and Liquidity Coverage Ratios (LCR) were reduced from 100% to 80% in Kuwait³⁷. Central banks offered unlimited repurchase (repo) windows to mitigate potential cash shortages³⁸. The UAE issued a \$5.4 billion currency swap line to Bahrain to stabilize the latter's financial system, while Bahrain utilized \$249 million from public unemployment funds to pay private-sector salaries in April³⁴. Despite these measures, the war inflicted a permanent shift in long-term capital allocation, shattering the narrative of the Gulf as a permanently safe haven for foreign direct investment and forcing a strategic pivot toward internal infrastructure resilience⁹.

The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and H2 2026 Trajectory

The unbearable economic toll of the conflict culminated in a frantic diplomatic push to restore global supply chains. On June 17, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian remotely signed the "Islamabad Memorandum of

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr. Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

Understanding" (MoU)³⁹.

Brokered primarily by Pakistan and Qatar, the 14-point framework agreement established an immediate 60-day cessation of hostilities and mandated the toll-free reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping³⁹. In exchange, the United States lifted its naval blockade of Iranian ports and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued "General License X" on June 22. This temporary waiver allowed the production, sale, delivery, and insurance of Iranian crude oil and petrochemicals on the global market through August 21, 2026¹⁶. Furthermore, the MoU controversially committed the U.S. and regional partners to develop a \$300 billion reconstruction and economic development plan for Iran, pending a final nuclear resolution, with U.S. officials suggesting the GCC would fund this package³⁹.

While the MoU provided immediate psychological relief to global commodity markets—sending Brent crude back down below \$80 a barrel and alleviating the MCCI—macroeconomists caution against premature optimism⁴⁴. The structural damage inflicted in the first half of the year is deeply entrenched. The physical destruction of LNG facilities in Qatar, refineries in Saudi Arabia, and petrochemical plants in Iran will sustain supply bottlenecks well into 2027³⁰.

For the GCC, while oil revenues will sequentially improve in H2 2026 as storage clears and shipments resume, non-oil sectors are expected to experience a prolonged lag in recovery due to shattered consumer and investor confidence³³. For the United States, the inflationary pulse introduced in Q1 and Q2 has cemented a restrictive interest rate environment, dampening long-term credit growth³.

Moreover, the MoU contains critical ambiguities. It mandates toll-free passage for only 60 days, leaving the door open for Iran to implement a maritime tolling mechanism overseen by the sanctioned Persian Gulf Strait Authority¹⁶. Geopolitical analysts assign a 60% probability to the resumption of hostilities or hybrid "Shadow Fleet" warfare post-November 2026, suggesting that the risk premium built into global shipping insurance is effectively permanent¹¹.

Conclusion

The 2026 Gulf War, characterized by Operation Epic Fury and the dual blockades of the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrated the extreme fragility of the highly optimized global economic system. The variance in GDP impacts across the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC highlights a profound evolution in modern economic warfare: the weaponization of maritime chokepoints and insurance architectures can inflict systemic macroeconomic devastation equivalent to widespread kinetic bombardment.

The data from January to June 2026 clearly illustrates that while the United States leveraged its technological integration and geographic insulation to maintain positive GDP growth, frontline Middle Eastern actors suffered catastrophic losses. The GCC's "Hormuz Paradox" proved that immense commodity wealth is irrelevant without secure logistical transit, while Israel and Iran absorbed deep structural damage to their labor pools and physical capital, respectively. Ultimately, while the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding has temporarily uncorked the global supply chain, it has not erased the severe economic scarring of the first half of the year. The crisis has catalyzed an irreversible paradigm shift. Nations are now

The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

Dr.Peter Varghese, Mrs. Anseera K

forcefully incentivized to transition away from hyper-efficient, single-point-of-failure supply chains toward localized, redundant, and highly secured economic models. The GDP variations of 2026 will reverberate as the primary catalyst for the reconfiguration of global trade, regional security alliances, and macroeconomic policy for the next decade.

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The Macroeconomic Impact of the 2026 Gulf War on the GDP Variation of the United States, Israel, Iran, and the GCC: A Cross-Country Analysis

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